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This	  paper	  examines	  to	  what	  extent	  banks	  with	  outstanding	  Troubled	  Asset	  Relief	  Program	  (TARP)	  debt	  
are	  perceived	  as	  potential	  takeover	  targets.	  	  Each	  bank's	  price-­‐to-­‐tangible-­‐book	  value	  is	  related	  to	  a	  
series	  of	  fundamental	  bank	  ratios	  and	  market	  index	  as	  well	  as	  a	  series	  of	  TARP	  variables	  that	  capture	  if	  a	  
bank	  took	  TARP	  and	  for	  how	  long.	  The	  results	  show	  that	  middle	  tiered	  banks	  (with	  assets	  between	  500	  
million	  and	  5	  billion)	  are	  positively	  associated	  with	  retaining	  TARP,	  which	  may	  suggest	  they	  are	  
perceived	  as	  takeover	  targets.	  In	  addition,	  banks	  with	  higher	  valuations	  have	  lower	  non-­‐performing	  
assets,	  net	  charge	  offs,	  loan	  loss	  reserves,	  tier	  1	  capital	  ratios,	  real	  estate	  and	  development	  loans.	  A	  
higher	  price-­‐to-­‐tangible-­‐book	  value	  is	  also	  associated	  with	  higher	  returns	  on	  average	  tangible	  common	  
equity	  and	  interest	  income.	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   Although	  a	  lot	  has	  been	  written	  on	  the	  Troubled	  Asset	  Relief	  Program	  (TARP),	  an	  over	  200	  billion	  
dollar	   capital	   injection	   into	   the	  American	   banking	   system,	   little	   has	   been	   said	   on	   the	   effects	   of	   these	  
loans	  on	  bank	  stock	  valuations	  and	  their	  possible	  interpretations.	  This	  paper	  seeks	  to	  fill	  this	  gap	  in	  the	  
literature	   and	   to	   examine	   whether	   or	   not	   publicly	   traded	   banks	   with	   outstanding	   TARP	   in	   2012	   are	  
perceived	   as	   potential	   takeover	   targets.	   Part	   of	   the	   rationale	   behind	   this	   lies	   in	   the	   way	   the	   TARP	  
program	  was	  designed.	  For	  the	  first	  five	  years,	   interest	  on	  TARP	  payments	  (structured	  as	  dividends	  on	  
preferred	   stock)	  was	   fixed	  at	  5%,	   thereafter	   increasing	   to	  9%.	   In	  essence,	   the	  cost	  of	  maintaining	   this	  
capital	  almost	  doubles	  overnight.	  	  
	   We	  are	  now	  approaching	  this	  "five	  year	  barrier."	  Healthier	  and	  stronger	  banks	  have	  in	  general	  
been	  able	  to	  pay	  back	  their	  debt,	  whereas	  weaker	  banks	  have	  not.	  These	  banks	  usually	  do	  not	  have	  the	  
resources	  to	  pay	  TARP	  and/or	  cannot	  raise	  capital	  to	  do	  so.	  This	  could	  push	  them	  to	  sell,	  which	  raises	  
the	  question:	  Is	  TARP	  effectively	  an	  indicator	  of	  a	  bank	  being	  a	  takeover	  target?	  Is	  the	  market	  perceiving	  
it	  that	  way	  in	  its	  valuation?	  Does	  the	  size	  of	  the	  bank	  matter?	  	  
	   This	  examination	  looks	  at	  826	  publicly	  traded	  banks	  from	  the	  first	  quarter	  in	  2005	  to	  the	  second	  
quarter	  of	  2012	  to	  address	  these	  questions.	  As	  of	  the	  second	  quarter	  of	  2012,	  124	  of	  these	  banks	  were	  
still	  participating	   in	  TARP,	  154	  had	  already	  redeemed	  it,	  and	  505	  never	  participated.	  The	  remainder	  of	  
the	  sample	  either	  applied	  and	  were	  not	  approved,	  were	  approved	  but	  never	  participated,	  resold	  their	  
TARP	  obligation	  to	  another	   investor,	  or	  converted	  it	   into	  another	  type	  of	  bond.	  All	  observations	   in	  the	  
sample	  are	  quarterly	  and	  taken	  from	  SNL	  Financial	  and/or	  SEC	  Filings.	  
2.	  Background	  
	   Emerging	   from	   "the	   great	   recession"	   of	   2009	   has	   proven	   more	   difficult	   than	   most	   first	  
anticipated,	   especially	   for	   the	  banking	   sector.	   From	  December	  29,	   2006	   through	  March	  31,	   2009,	   the	  
S&P	  Bank	  index	  dropped	  over	  80%	  (see	  Figure	  1),	  almost	  double	  the	  setback	  for	  the	  market	  as	  a	  whole.	  
In	  an	  effort	  to	  mitigate	  a	  rapidly	  deteriorating	  situation	  and	  restore	  confidence	  in,	  and	  liquidity	  to,	  the	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financial	   system,	   President	   George	   W.	   Bush	   signed	   on	   October	   3rd,	   2008,	   the	   Emergency	   Economic	  
Stabilization	   Act	   establishing	   a	   $700	   billion	   fund	   called	   Troubled	   Asset	   Relief	   Program	   (TARP).	   On	  
October	  14th	  the	  Treasury	  announced	  that	  some	  of	  the	  funds	  would	  be	  distributed	  through	  the	  Capital	  
Purchase	   Program	   (CPP)	   which	   allowed	   financial	   institutions	   to	   apply	   for	   preferred	   equity	   capital	  
injections,	  beginning	  with	  distributions	  totalizing	  $125	  billion	  to	  nine	  of	  the	  largest	  financial	  institutions	  
in	  the	  United	  States.	  Figure	  1	  displays	  the	  market	  fluctuations	  during	  this	  time	  period,	  the	  dotted	  lines	  
indicating	  the	  day	  the	  CPP	  program	  was	  announced	  (to	  which	  the	  date	  in	  the	  chart	  are	  indexed)	  and	  the	  
passing	  of	  the	  Dodd-­‐Frank	  Act	  respectively.	  This	  clearly	  demonstrates	  that	  even	  after	  the	  onset	  of	  TARP,	  
bank	  stocks	  have	  lagged	  the	  overall	  market,	  especially	  in	  the	  past	  four	  years.	  	  
	   From	  the	  beginning	  there	  was	  great	  controversy	  over	  the	  injections.	  Critics	  felt	  that	  banks	  were	  
responsible	  for	  the	  crisis	  to	  begin	  with	  and	  should	  thus	  not	  be	  "bailed	  out."	  Larger	  banks	  came	  to	  attach	  
a	   certain	   "stigma"	   to	   taking	  TARP	  and	   felt	   themselves	   scrutinized	  by	   the	  national	  media.	   These	  banks	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moved	  very	  quickly	   to	   repay,	   in	   large	  part	   to	  avoid	   incipient	   restrictions	  on	  executive	  pay.	  Conversely	  
smaller	  banks	  that	  took	  TARP	  only	  dealt	  with	  the	  local	  media	  and	  their	  customers,	  which	  tended	  to	  be	  
less	   confrontational.	   (Wilson	   and	  Wu,	   2008).	   These	   banks	   generally	   held	   on	   to	   their	   TARP	  money	   for	  
longer.	  	  
	   	  There	  are	  a	  couple	  of	  things	  to	  note	  about	  the	  overall	  TARP	  process.	  The	  first	  is	  that	  under	  the	  
terms	  of	  the	  Capital	  Purchase	  Program,	  banks	  were	  only	  allowed	  to	  obtain	  between	  1%	  and	  3%	  of	  their	  
risk-­‐weighted	  assets	  in	  TARP	  funds.	  The	  second	  is	  that	  banks	  tended	  to	  pay	  back	  TARP	  all	  at	  once	  instead	  
of	  in	  installment	  (though	  this	  was	  not	  required).	  Of	  the	  sample	  studied,	  fewer	  than	  10%	  paid	  TARP	  back	  
in	   installments.	   On	   a	   final	   note,	   all	   banks	   that	   were	   acquired	   while	   still	   retaining	   TARP	   had	   their	  
outstanding	  balance	  paid	  back	  by	  the	  buyer	  as	  part	  of	  the	  deal.	  No	  buyers	  assumed	  their	  target's	  TARP	  
debt	  for	  any	  meaningful	  period.	  	  	  
	   	  	  This	  paper	  is	  organized	  in	  the	  following	  manner.	  It	  begins	  by	  discussing	  all	  relevant	  literature	  on	  
TARP	  and	  other	  research	  pertaining	  to	  the	  subject.	  It	  proceeds	  by	  developing	  a	  hypothesis	  followed	  by	  a	  
discussion	   of	   the	   data	   and	   methodology	   adopted.	   Lastly	   it	   reports	   the	   results	   and	   concludes	   with	   a	  
discussion	  of	  this	  paper's	  findings	  and	  its	  implication	  for	  further	  research.	  	  
2.	  Literature	  Review	  
	   The	   literature	   surrounding	   TARP	   usually	   focuses	   on	   one	   of	   two	   areas.	   The	   first,	   and	   little	  
developed,	   is	  where	   a	   gap	   exists:	   the	   relationship	   between	   TARP	   and	   a	   bank's	   valuation.	   The	   second	  
examines	  the	  characteristics	  of	  banks	  that	  first	  applied	  to	  TARP	  and	  were	  either	  accepted	  or	  denied,	  and	  
the	   characteristics	   of	   banks	   that	   paid	   TARP.	   These	   two	  will	   be	   briefly	   reviewed	   below	   after	   an	   initial	  
examination	   of	   price-­‐to-­‐tangible-­‐book	   value,	   a	   common	  metric	   of	   study	   in	   previous	   papers,	   and	   the	  
dependent	  variable	  of	  this	  paper.	  	  
2.1.	  Use	  of	  Market-­‐price	  to	  book-­‐value	  
	   The	   valuation	  metric	   used	   as	   the	   dependent	   variable	   in	   this	   study	   is,	   as	  mentioned,	   price-­‐to-­‐
tangible	  book.	  The	  price-­‐to-­‐tangible-­‐book	  ratio	  represents	  "a	  bank's	  ability	  to	  earn	  excess	  profit	   in	  the	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future	   from	   its	   current	   capital	   base	   along	   with	   its	   future	   growth	   opportunities"	   (Jason	   et.	   al.,	   2011).	  
Market-­‐price-­‐to-­‐book	  value	  or	  price-­‐to-­‐tangible	  book	  value	   compares	   the	   share	  price	  of	  a	  bank,	   to	   its	  
tangible	   assets	   per	   share,	   as	   reported	   on	   its'	   balance	   sheet.	   The	   tangible	   book	   value	   is	   calculated	   by	  
subtracting	  a	  company's	  liabilities	  and	  intangible	  assets	  (i.e.	  patents,	  intellectual	  property	  and	  goodwill)	  
from	  its	  assets,	  all	  divided	  by	  the	  number	  of	  shares	  outstanding.	  It	  is	  a	  theoretical	  measure	  of	  what	  an	  
investor	  would	  receive	  per	  share	  should	  the	  company	  be	  liquidated	  today.	  So	  if	  a	  bank	  stock	  trades	  at	  
"book	  value"	  or	  100,	  that	  means	  the	  market	  is	  valuing	  the	  bank	  at	  what	  its	  assets	  are	  worth	  should	  they	  
be	   sold	   today.	  Before	   the	   crisis,	   banks	   traded	  at	   three	   to	   four	   times	   their	   tangible	  book	   value.	   Today	  
most	  trade	  at	  or	  below	  book.	  
	   Hunter	  and	  Wall	  (1989)	  find	  significant	  relationships	  between	  the	  price-­‐to-­‐book	  value	  of	  banks	  
and	  measures	  of	  profitability,	  growth,	  and	  loans	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  earning	  assets.	  Yao	  and	  Liang	  (2005)	  
extend	   this	   and	   find	   significant	   relationships	   of	   price-­‐to-­‐tangible-­‐book	   value	  with	   net	   interest	  margin,	  
bad	   debt	   expense,	   non-­‐performing	   loans	   and	   bank	   efficiency	   ratios.	   These	   empirical	   studies	   provide	  
some	  baseline	  from	  which	  to	  examine	  the	  effects	  of	  TARP.	  
	  
2.2.	  TARP	  Preferred	  Equity	  Stock	  and	  their	  effects	  on	  common	  stock	  prices	  
	   As	  mentioned,	  the	  capital	  purchase	  program	  (CPP)	  took	  the	  form	  of	  a	  preferred	  equity	  purchase	  
by	   the	   Treasury	  Department,	  which	  means	   that	   it	   bought	   a	   new	   class	   of	   preferred	   equity	   stock	   from	  
banks	   created	   specifically	   for	   TARP.	   The	   advantage	   of	   this	   mechanism	   is	   that	   preferred	   stock	   is	   not	  
publicly	  traded	  and	  does	  not	  have	  voting	  rights.	  Preferred	  equity	  holders	  also	  get	  paid	  before	  common	  
stock	   holders.	   In	   the	   end,	   the	   capital	   purchase	   program	  was	   designed	   so	   banks	   essentially	   took	   on	   a	  
fixed	  interest	  loan	  from	  the	  Treasury.	  	  
	   	  The	   effect	   on	   common	   stock	   of	   issuing	   preferred	   stock,	   especially	   TARP	   preferred	   stock,	   is	  
dubious	  at	  best.	  In	  a	  paper	  entitled	  "Paulson's	  Gift"	  (a	  reference	  to	  former	  US	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Treasury	  
Henry	   Paulson)	   Veronesi	   and	   Zingales	   (2008)	   examine	   the	   effects	   of	   the	   first	   round	   of	   TARP	   capital	  
7	  
	  
injections	  on	  the	  largest	  and	  first	  nine	  recipients.	  They	  calculate	  a	  $2.6	  billion	  decrease	  in	  equity	  but	  an	  
overall	  benefit	  to	  taxpayers	  of	  between	  $86	  and	  $109	  billion	  due	  to	  an	  efficiency	  gain,	  albeit	  at	  a	  cost	  of	  
between	   $21-­‐44bn	   to	   the	   very	   same	   group	   (net	   benefit	   of	   between	   42-­‐88bn).	   They	   find	   that	   this	  
particular	   government	   intervention	   decreases	   enterprise	   value	   (a	   measure	   of	   value	   calculated	   by	  
summing	  market	  capitalization	  and	  debt	  minus	  liquid	  assets)	  by	  2.5%	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  also	  reduces	  
the	   possibility	   of	   bankruptcy,	  which	  would	   in	   turn	   reduce	   enterprise	   value	   by	   an	   estimated	   22%.	   The	  
greater	   the	   possibility	   of	   bankruptcy,	   the	   less	   the	  market	   capitalization	   as	   share	   holders	   sell	   off	   their	  
holdings,	  thus	  the	  smaller	  the	  enterprise	  value.	  
2.3.	  TARP	  and	  Bank	  Valuation	  
	   In	  a	  paper	  written	  in	  2011,	  Jordan,	  Rice,	  Sanchez	  and	  Wort	  first	  raised	  the	  concern	  that	  nowhere	  
in	  the	  literature	  was	  there	  a	  discussion	  the	  relationship	  between	  market-­‐to-­‐book	  ratios	  and	  the	  receipt	  
of	  TARP	  funds.	  They	  sought	  to	  remedy	  that	  and	  this	  paper	  builds	  on	  their	  example.	  Using	  a	  sample	  of	  
283	  publicly	   traded	  banks	   all	   of	  whom	   took	  TARP,	   they	  develop	   a	   fixed-­‐effects	   regression	  model	   that	  
controls	   for	   size,	   metropolitan	   statistical	   areas,	   whether	   or	   not	   a	   bank	   is	   structured	   as	   a	   holding	  
company,	  and	   if	  a	  savings	  bank	  or	  not.	  Their	  TARP	  variable	   is	  designed	  as	  a	  dummy,	  1	   for	  TARP	  funds	  
received,	  0	  if	  not.	  Their	  approach	  includes	  a	  series	  of	  bank	  fundamental	  ratios	  as	  control	  variables:	  non-­‐
interest	   income	   to	   interest	   income	   (a	  measure	   of	   profitability	   not	   resultant	   from	   loans),	   non-­‐accrual	  
assets	  plus	  owned	  real	  estate	  to	  total	  assets	   (a	  measure	  of	  credit),	   ratio	  of	   interest	   income	  to	  earning	  
assets	  (another	  measure	  of	  profitability	  resultant	  from	  loans)	  and	  finally,	  Tier	  One	  capital	  to	  total	  assets	  
(a	  measure	  of	  capital).	  All	  these	  are	  reported	  on	  bank	  fillings.	  	  
	   They	  find	  that	  banks	  that	  took	  TARP	  have	  lower	  market-­‐to-­‐book	  ratios.	  They	  also	  find	  that	  banks	  
with	   higher	   valuations	   have	   lower	   relative	   costs,	   higher	   non-­‐interest	   and	   interest	   income,	   and	   lower	  
assets	   in	   non-­‐accrual	   or	   foreclosure	   status.	   They	   also	   find	   that	   an	   increase	   in	   Tier	   One	   capital	   is	  
associated	  with	  higher	  market-­‐price	  to	  book-­‐value	  rations.	  Overall	  their	  sample	  is	  limited	  in	  the	  number	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of	   banks	   and	   time	   frame	   (2006-­‐09),	   a	   period	  when	   the	   stock	  market	   as	   a	  whole,	   and	   especially	   bank	  
stocks,	  were	  under	  pressure.	  	  
2.4.	  Characteristics	  of	  Banks	  who	  Applied	  for	  and/or	  Paid	  Back	  TARP	  
	   Bayazitova	  and	  Shivdasani	  (2011)	  systematically	  examine	  a	  sample	  of	  590	  publicly	  traded	  banks	  
to	   get	   at	   the	   characteristics	   of	   banks	   entering	   and	   leaving	   TARP.	   They	   ran	   three	   regressions:	   the	   first	  
tries	   to	   capture	   the	   characteristics	   of	   banks	   that	   applied	   for	   TARP	   and	   took	   the	   money,	   the	   second	  
examines	  banks	  who	  applied	  for	  TARP	  but	  did	  not	  take	  the	  funds	  and,	  the	  last	  looks	  at	  banks	  who	  repaid	  
TARP	  (a	  subset	  of	  group	  1).	  They	  conclude	  that	  banks	  that	  got	  approved	  and	  took	  funds	  tended	  to	  be	  
larger	   and	   posed	   greater	   systemic	   risk,	   and	   banks	  with	   less	   stable	   funding	  mixes	  were	  more	   likely	   to	  
receive	  funds.	  Capital	  purchase	  program	  infusions	  did	  not	  support	  banks	  with	  terrible	  loan	  portfolios	  as	  
measured	  by	  asset	  quality	   (i.e.	  banks	  with	   larger	  net	  charge-­‐offs,	   loan	   loss	  provisions	  and	  asset	  write-­‐
downs	  were	   less	   likely	  to	  be	  approved	  for	  TARP	  funds).	  They	  also	  conclude	  that	  stronger	  banks	  rather	  
than	   weaker	   ones	   opted	   out	   of	   participating	   in	   TARP.	   Banks	   that	   got	   approved	   but	   chose	   to	   not	  
participate	   were	   located	   in	   better	   performing	   regions	   and	   banks	   where	   the	   CEO	   earned	   more	   than	  
$500,000	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  reject	  TARP	  funds.	  This	  last	  point	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  salary	  restrictions	  
imposed	   on	   bank	   management	   teams	   participating	   in	   TARP.	   On	   February	   4th,	   2009	   (5	   months	   after	  
TARP	   began),	   Secretary	   Geithner	   implemented	   restrictions	   on	   executive	   salaries	   as	   well	   as	   golden	  
parachute	   payments.	   Bonus	   claw-­‐back	   provisions	  were	   also	   put	   in	   place,	   all	   in	   response	   to	   perceived	  
scandals	  associated	  with	  big	  banks	  using	  TARP	  money	  inappropriately.	  	  
	   Bayazitova	   and	   Shivdasani	   (2011)	   conclude	   when	   looking	   at	   banks	   who	   paid	   back	   TARP	   that	  
larger	   well-­‐capitalized	   banks	   with	   better	   assets	   tend	   to	   repay	   TARP	   sooner	   and	   a	   high	   level	   of	   CEO	  
compensation	   in	  a	   year	  prior	   to	   taking	  TARP	   increases	   the	   likelihood	   that	   the	  bank	  will	   repay	   sooner.	  
Wilson	  and	  Wu	  (2012)	  take	  this	  last	  idea	  further	  in	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  factors	  associated	  with	  banks	  
exiting	   TARP.	   "A	   two	   standard	   deviation	   increase	   in	   median	   total	   CEO	   pay	   causes	   the	   predicted	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probability	   of	   exit	   to	   climb	   from	   just	   under	   8%	   to	   just	   over	   80%."1	   They	   also	   find	   that	   larger	   publicly	  
traded	  banks	  with	  better	  performance,	   stronger	   capital,	   and	   fewer	   troubled	   loans	   tend	   to	  exit	   earlier	  
and	   that	  banks	   that	   raised	  capital	   in	  2009	  are	  more	   likely	   to	   return	   the	   taxpayer's	  money.	  Banks	   that	  
chose	  to	  participate	  in	  TARP	  after	  the	  pay	  restrictions	  were	  imposed	  tend	  to	  be	  smaller,	  have	  less	  capital	  
and	  more	  problem	  assets.	  	  
	   For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	   investigation	  there	  are	  a	  couple	  things	  to	  note.	  The	  first	   is	   that	  banks	  
that	  tended	  to	  participate	  in	  TARP	  in	  the	  beginning	  were	  larger	  and	  moved	  to	  pay	  back	  their	  loan	  sooner	  
rather	  than	  later,	  much	  because	  of	  the	  pay	  restrictions.	  The	  second	  is	  that	  banks	  who	  did	  not	  pay	  back	  
TARP	  and	   the	  subsequent	  banks	   that	  chose	   to	  participate	  after	   the	  pay	   restrictions,	  were	  smaller	  and	  
more	  problematic.	  All	   that	  said,	  and	  the	  third	  thing	  worth	  noting,	   is	  that	  TARP	  money	  did	  not	  support	  
banks	  with	   terrible	   loan	   portfolios	   (as	  measured	   by	   asset	   quality).	   Thus	   the	   banks	  who	   continued	   to	  
retain	  TARP	  were	  weaker	  and	  smaller	  but	  not	  necessarily	  the	  worst	  banks,	  which	  in	  function	  of	  their	  size	  
and	  loan	  business	  may	  make	  them	  great	  acquisition	  targets.	  	  	  
3.Hypothesis	  Development	  
	   Although	   Jordan,	   Rice,	   Sanchez	   and	   Wort	   (2011)	   developed	   a	   strong	   model	   to	   capture	   the	  
relationship	  between	  TARP	  and	  the	  market-­‐to-­‐book	  ratio,	  they	  never	  examined	  some	  of	  the	  implications	  
of	   their	   findings,	   simply	   concluding	   that	   TARP	   had	   an	   adverse	   effect	   on	   bank	   valuations.	   This	   paper	  
develops	   their	   ideas	   further	   in	   a	   couple	   of	   ways.	   First	   it	   increases	   the	   sample	   size	   by	   including	   both	  
banks	   that	   took	  and	  those	  that	  did	  not	   take	  TARP	  and	  secondly	   it	  covers	  a	   larger	   time	  frame	  past	   the	  
trough	   of	   the	   cycle.	   In	   addition	   it	   draws	   on	   literature	   and	   bank	   statements	   for	   a	   richer	   set	   of	  
fundamental	   bank	   financial	   metrics	   to	   capture	   effects	   not	   related	   to	   TARP.	   Fourthly	   it	   sets	   about	  
capturing	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  number	  of	  quarters	  a	  bank	  holds	  on	  to	  TARP,	  which	  may	  have	  a	  significant	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Wilson	  and	  Wu,	  40	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impact	   in	  a	  bank's	  valuation.	  Lastly,	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  investigation	  is	  expanded	  beyond	  just	  a	  simple	  
relationship	  to	  that	  of	  identifying	  if	  in	  fact	  TARP	  could	  be	  an	  indicator	  of	  a	  bank	  being	  a	  takeover	  target.	  
	   The	  motivation	  behind	  this	  paper	  also	  comes	  from	  a	  larger	  market	  trend,	  one	  of	  consolidation.	  
There	  are	   currently	  918	  publicly	   traded	  banks	   in	   the	  United	  States	   alone,	  not	   counting	  private	  banks.	  
Even	  for	  a	  market	  as	  large	  as	  the	  one	  these	  banks	  service,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  there	  are	  too	  many	  banks.	  The	  
recent	   recession	  has	   put	   pressure	  on	   the	  weaker	   ones	   to	   either	   sell	   or	   declare	   bankruptcy.	   Since	   the	  
onset	  of	  TARP	  on	  October	  14th,	  2008,	   four	  hundred	  and	   fifty	  merger	  and	  acquisition	  deals	  have	  been	  
completed,	  which	  begs	  the	  question:	  why	  are	  so	  many	  banks	  selling?2	  It	  could	  just	  be	  that	  some	  of	  these	  
potential	   targets	  are	  banks	   in	   great	   regional	  markets	  but	  either	  because	  of	  bad	  management	  or	  poor	  
credit	  writing,	  have	  been	  doing	  very	  badly,	  thus	  making	  them	  great	  targets.	  It	  could	  also	  be	  that	  these	  
banks,	  may	  no	   longer	  be	  viable	   in	  their	  own	  right	  and/or	  may	  be	  poorly	  sized	  for	  the	  market	  they	  are	  
servicing.	   All	   that	   said,	   this	   would	   also	   be	   true	   outside	   a	   recession,	   the	   difference	   now	   being	   these	  
weaker	  banks	  are	  being	  pushed	  to	  the	  breaking	  point,	   for	  macroeconomic,	   regulatory	  and	   legal	   issues	  
that	  came	  about	  specifically	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  "great	  recession."	  On	  the	  macroeconomic	  front,	  historic	  
low	   interest	   rates	   and	   the	   slow	   recovery	   are	   not	   conducive	   to	   bank	   earnings	   in	   general,	   let	   alone	   an	  
already	  struggling	  bank.	  Atop	  of	  all	  that,	  the	  new	  regulatory	  environment	  ushered	  in	  by	  the	  Dodd-­‐Frank	  
Act	   as	  well	   as	   Basel	   III	   are	   often	   hard	   to	   navigate	   and	   expensive	   legally	   to	   implement.	   Atop	   all	   these	  
explanations	  and	  possibly	  even	  as	  a	  result	  of	  them,	  it	  may	  just	  be	  that	  banks	  are	  selling	  because	  they	  are	  
cheap.	  Many	  of	  the	  weaker	  banks	  are	  now	  trading	  below	  their	  "book	  value"	  i.e.	  they	  are	  now	  trading	  at	  
below	  what	  their	  liquid	  assets	  are	  worth	  if	  sold.	  	  
	   The	  argument	   in	   favor	  of	  a	  merger	   lies	   in	   the	   fact	  a	   larger	  bank	  can	  provide	   for	  economies	  of	  
scale,	  making	   an	   unviable	   bank,	   viable.	   Acquisition	   deals	   often	   result	   in	   favorable	   "synergies,"	  where	  
redundant	   costs	   are	   cut	   and	   the	   combined	   entity	   is	  more	   efficient.	   	   A	   larger	   bank	   can	   thus	   absorb	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Information	  drawn	  from	  SNL	  Financial.	  Data	  filtered	  to	  include	  at	  least	  one	  publicly	  traded	  bank,	  be	  it	  buyer	  or	  
seller.	  This	  number	  does	  not	  include	  government	  assisted	  deals.	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smaller	  one	  thereby	  increasing	  its	  operation	  and	  profit	  that	  way,	  versus	  trying	  to	  grow	  organically	  in	  an	  
already	   saturated	   market.	   For	   the	   smaller	   entity	   it	   may	   suddenly	   be	   in	   the	   "best	   interest"	   of	   its	  
shareholders	  to	  sell,	  if	  they	  receive	  a	  bonus	  atop	  their	  otherwise	  depressed	  stock	  (which	  as	  mentioned	  
have	  lagged	  the	  market	  for	  the	  past	  four	  years).	  
	   As	  we	  have	  seen,	  and	  in	  light	  of	  this	  general	  scenario,	  a	  large	  number	  of	  banks	  have	  taken	  TARP	  
money	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  grow	  their	  loan	  book	  and	  provide	  much	  needed	  liquidity.	  The	  stronger	  ones	  have	  
paid	  it	  back,	  but	  the	  weaker	  ones	  have	  not,	  perhaps	  identifying	  themselves	  as	  the	  very	  banks	  that	  would	  
make	  great	  targets.	  The	  situation	  is	  further	  exacerbated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  are	  now	  approach	  the	  end	  
of	   the	   initial	   five	   year	   period,	   whereupon	   the	   interest	   jumps	   to	   9%,	   almost	   doubling	   the	   cost	   of	  
maintaining	   this	  capital.	  Thus	  could	   the	   fact	   that	  a	  bank	  still	   retains	  TARP,	  all	  other	   things	  equal,	  be	  a	  
good	   indicator	   that	   it	   is	   a	   target?	   Could	   it	   be	  what	   pushes	   a	   bank	   over	   the	   edge	   and	   thus	   to	   sell	   or	  
conversely	  be	  acquired?	  
	   As	  of	  the	  second	  quarter	  2012	  when	  the	  sample	  ends,	  the	  banks	  that	  have	  held	  on	  to	  TARP	  the	  
longest	  are	  five	  quarters	  from	  the	  interest	  rising.	  As	  we	  approach	  the	  "five	  year	  jump"	  three	  scenarios	  
are	  possible.	  The	   first	   is	   that	   if	   the	  banks	   in	  question	  are	  perceived	  as	   targets,	   their	  price-­‐to-­‐tangible-­‐
book	   value	   would	   register	   a	   positive	   effect	   as	   retail	   and	   institutional	   investors	   buy	   the	   stock	   in	  
anticipation	  of	  an	  acquisition.	  There	  may	  not	  be	  a	  bid	  for	  that	  bank	  out	  there,	  but	  the	  probability	  of	  a	  
bid	  leads	  to	  speculation	  by	  investors.	  Certain	  conditions	  make	  a	  bid	  more	  likely,	  maybe	  having	  TARP	  is	  
one	  of	  them.	  The	  second	  and	  opposite	  could	  also	  be	  true.	  As	  we	  near	  the	  time	  when	  the	  interest	  jumps,	  
the	  market	  may	  be	  perceiving	  these	  banks	  as	  junk	  due	  to	  their	  inability	  to	  pay	  back	  TARP	  and	  thus	  not	  
worthy	  of	  a	  takeover	  at	  all.	  The	  final	  possibility	  is	  that	  there	  is	  no	  change	  at	  all.	  It	  is	  worth	  at	  this	  point	  
discussing	  a	  practical	  example.	  
	   On	  October	  23rd,	  2012	  (after	  the	  period	  this	  paper	  investigates	  and	  thus	  even	  closer	  to	  the	  "five	  
year	  jump"	  in	  TARP	  interest)	  F.N.B.	  Corp	  (FNB),	  based	  in	  Hermitage,	  Pa,	  announced	  it	  would	  be	  acquiring	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Annapolis	  Bancorp	  Inc.	  (ANNB),	  based	  in	  Annapolis,	  Md.	  The	  deal,	  estimated	  in	  $51	  million,	  allows	  FNB	  
to	  enter	   the	  greater	  Baltimore	  and	  Washington	  D.C.	  areas	   (i.e.	  attractive	  markets).	  Annapolis	  Bancorp	  
has	  been	  participating	  in	  the	  TARP	  program	  since	  its	  onset	  in	  the	  fourth	  quarter	  of	  2008.	  It	  has	  still	  not	  
paid	  back	  its	  debt.	  As	  part	  of	  the	  deal,	  ANNB	  will	  be	  redeeming	  all	  preferred	  stock	  issued	  under	  TARP.	  As	  
the	   chart	  below	  demonstrates,	   in	   the	  months	   leading	  up	   to	   the	  announcement	  of	   the	  deal,	  we	   see	  a	  
general	  rising	  trend	  in	  the	  stock	  price	  presumably	  because	  of	  the	  very	  speculation	  that	  ANNB	  might	  sell.	  
As	   one	   can	   see,	   ANNB	   stock	   pretty	  much	   followed	   the	   general	   banking	   index	   in	   the	   year	   before	   the	  
acquisition,	  whereas	   in	   the	  year	   it	   sold,	   the	  stock	  climbed	   independent	  of	   the	  market.	  When	   the	  deal	  
was	  made	  public,	  the	  stock	  jumped	  as	  expected.3	  	  
	  	  
	   This	   paper	   builds	   upon	   the	   Jordan,	   Rice,	   Sanchez	   and	   Wort	   (2011)	   model,	   and	   in	   order	   to	  
capture	  the	  effects	  of	  TARP	  on	  a	  bank's	  price-­‐to-­‐tangible-­‐book	  value	  three	  variables	  were	  created.	  The	  
first	  and	  in	  line	  with	  their	  model	  was	  a	  TARP	  dummy	  variable.	  The	  TARP	  dummy	  registers	  if	  a	  given	  bank	  
had	  TARP	  money	  in	  a	  respective	  quarter	  (1	  for	  TARP,	  0	  for	  no	  TARP	  in	  that	  quarter	  or	  ever).	  The	  quarter	  




a	   bank	   pays	   back	   TARP	   receives	   a	   0	   due	   to	   the	   fact	   the	  market	   prices	   that	   into	   their	   valuation.	   This	  
dummy	   captures	   the	   immediate	   effect	   of	   taking	   TARP	   upon	   a	   stock.	   In	   order	   to	   capture	   the	   ongoing	  
effect	  of	  TARP	  upon	  a	  stock,	  a	  second	  variable,	  QUARTERS	  ON	  TARP	  was	  created.	  The	  idea	  is,	  the	  longer	  
you	  have	  TARP,	  the	  more	  likely	  you	  are	  to	  be	  a	  target	  especially	  as	  we	  near	  the	  "jump."	  The	  moment	  a	  
bank	  takes	  TARP	  it	  receives	  a	  1.	  The	  variable	  then	  increases	  by	  1	  every	  subsequent	  quarter	  going	  back	  to	  
zero	  when	  it	  gets	  paid	  back.	  No	  bank	  in	  the	  sample	  has	  reached	  the	  maximum	  or	  20	  quarters	  (5	  years).4	  
The	  way	  in	  which	  this	  variable	  was	  designed	  assumes	  that	  the	  trend	  in	  price-­‐to-­‐tangible-­‐book	  is	  linear	  in	  
relation	  to	  TARP,	  which	  may	  not	  be	  true.	  Thus	  a	  third	  variable	  was	  created	  to	  capture	  nonlinear	  effects.	  
This	  is	  simply	  the	  QUARTERS	  ON	  TARP	  variable	  squared.	  This	  allows	  one	  to	  capture	  if	  the	  closer	  we	  get	  
to	  the	  rise	  in	  interest,	  if	  price-­‐to-­‐tangible-­‐book	  goes	  up	  or	  down.	  	  
	   In	  line	  with	  the	  Jordan	  et.	  al.	  (2011)	  model,	  it	   is	  the	  opinion	  of	  the	  author	  that	  bank's	  price-­‐to-­‐
book-­‐values	   will	   be	   negatively	   correlated	   with	   the	   TARP	   dummy,	   registering	   a	   onetime	   effect.	  
Nonetheless	   and	   in	   line	   with	   the	   takeover	   thesis,	   price-­‐to-­‐tangible-­‐book-­‐value	   will	   be	   positively	  
correlated	  with	  the	  QUARTERS	  ON	  TARP	  variable	  and	  the	  QUARTERS	  ON	  TARP	  variable	  squared,	  for	  the	  
closer	  we	  get	  to	  the	  interest	  jump,	  the	  more	  likely	  a	  bank	  is	  to	  sell.	  This	  is	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  banks	  
that	  still	  retain	  TARP	  make	  attractive	  acquisitions	  for	  the	  reasons	  already	  delineated.	  In	  this	  scenario	  size	  
matters,	  for	  the	  biggest	  banks	  are	  not	  the	  ones	  likely	  to	  sell.	  It	  is	  more	  likely	  that	  the	  mid	  to	  small	  size	  
banks	  are	  the	  ones	  to	  sell.	  	  
	   Aside	  from	  the	  TARP	  explanatory	  variables,	  and	  in	  line	  with	  the	  literature,	  this	  paper	  draws	  upon	  
and	   introduces	  a	   list	  of	   fundamental	  variables	   typically	  used	   in	  appraising	  a	  bank's	  valuation.	  The	   first	  
couple	   are	  measures	   of	   credit	   quality.	   Instead	   of	   using	   the	   ratio	   of	   non-­‐accrual	   assets	   and	   other	   real	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  This	  variable	  was	  designed	  to	  count	  up,	  not	  down	  towards	  the	  "jump"	  in	  interest,	  the	  reason	  being	  the	  market	  
factored	  into	  its'	  valuation	  of	  a	  bank	  how	  many	  quarters	  a	  bank	  had	  TARP	  not	  the	  number	  of	  quarters	  until	  the	  
"jump"	  much	  because	  no	  one	  thought	  banks	  would	  retain	  TARP	  that	  far.	  	  This	  variable	  captures	  how	  long	  a	  bank	  is	  
holding	  on	  to	  this	  debt.	  It	  is	  only	  recently	  that	  the	  conversation	  has	  switched	  over	  to	  the	  fact	  the	  interest	  might	  
increase,	  a	  factor	  of	  how	  long	  these	  banks	  have	  held	  onto	  TARP.	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estate	   owned	   to	   total	   assets	   introduced	   by	   Jordan	   et.	   al.	   (2011),	   this	   paper	   opts	   for	   the	   more	  
comprehensive	  non-­‐performing	  assets	  (NPA's),	  also	  scaled	  to	  a	  percentage	  of	  total	  assets.	  This	  includes	  
all	   the	   components	   of	   the	   previous	   measure	   along	   with	   loans	   that	   have	   been	   restructured	   or	  
renegotiated	  by	  the	  bank.	  The	  higher	  the	  non	  performing	  assets	  the	  worse	  a	  bank's	   loan	  portfolio	  and	  
presumably	  the	  worse	  the	  valuation.	  	  The	  second	  measure	  of	  credit	  quality	  and	  one	  introduced	  by	  the	  
Bayazitova	   and	   Shivdasani	   (2011)	   paper,	   is	   net	   charge	   offs	   (NCO's).	   Net	   charge	   offs	   report	   loans	   that	  
have	  been	  written	  off	  the	  books	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  average	  loans.	  Assets	  that	  are	  non-­‐performing	  may	  
get	  charged-­‐off	  if	  a	  bank	  deems	  they	  cannot	  collect	  on	  a	  loan	  thus	  removing	  it	  from	  their	  balance	  sheet.	  
The	  higher	  the	  net	  charge	  off	  the	  worse	  a	  bank's	  loan	  portfolio.	  The	  final	  measure	  of	  credit	  quality,	  also	  
introduced	  by	  the	  Bayazitova	  et.	  al.	  (2011)	  paper	  is	  loan	  loss	  provision,	  also	  reported	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  
average	   loans.	   Loan	   loss	   provisions	   details	   how	  much	   a	   bank	   sets	   aside	   as	   a	   reserve	   for	   possible	   bad	  
loans.	  During	  the	  crisis,	  we	  saw	  this	  number	  rise	  sharply	  as	  the	  number	  of	  non-­‐performing	  loans	  shot	  up.	  
I	  expect	  this	  number	  to	  be	  negatively	  associate	  with	  a	  bank's	  valuation.	  
	   The	  second	  set	  of	  variables	  captures	  a	  bank's	  profitability.	  Return	  on	  average	  tangible	  common	  
equity	   is	   a	   common	   measure	   of	   performance,	   the	   larger	   the	   better.	   It	   is	   useful	   in	   comparing	   the	  
profitability	  of	  firms	  in	  the	  same	  industry	  and	  tells	  investors	  how	  much	  of	  profit	  (net	  income)	  a	  company	  
generates	   with	   investors'	   stake.	   Average	   tangible	   common	   equity	   includes	   common	   equity	   only	   (no	  
preferred	  stock)	  and	  removes	  all	  intangibles	  while	  averaging	  it	  over	  a	  quarter.	  The	  second	  performance	  
variable	  comes	   from	  the	  Jordan	  et.	  al.	   (2011)	  paper:	   interest	   income.	   Interest	   income	   is	   reported	  as	  a	  
percentage	  of	  average	  assets	  and	  tells	  us	  how	  much	  a	  bank	  earns	  in	  interest	  payments	  on	  outstanding	  
loans.	  The	  higher	   the	  better.	  The	   final	  performance	  variable,	  efficiency	   ratio,	  essentially	  captures	  how	  
much	  a	  bank	  would	  need	  to	  spend	  in	  order	  to	  generate	  an	  additional	  dollar	  of	  revenue,	  the	  lower	  the	  
better.	   Great	   banks	   hover	   around	   0.40.	   The	   calculation	   of	   the	   efficiency	   ratio	   can	   be	   inferred	   from	  
numbers	  reported	  in	  a	  bank's	  fillings.	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   The	  next	  variable,	  Tier	  1,	  measures	  capital	  adequacy.	  Used	  in	  both	  the	  Jordan	  et.	  al	  (2011)	  and	  
Bayazitova	  et.	  al.	   (2011)	  papers,	   the	  Tier	  1	   ratio	  measures	  a	  bank's	   capital	   from	  a	   regulator's	  point	  of	  
view	  and	  includes	  both	  common	  stock	  and	  retained	  earnings.	  Tier	  1	  capital	  is	  reported	  over	  total	  assets,	  
or	   in	  other	  words,	   it	   reports	  how	  much	  capital	   is	  available	  to	  support	  a	  bank's	  assets.	  Although	  a	  high	  
Tier	  1	  capital	  ratio	  signifies	  a	  bank	   is	  well	  capitalized,	   it	  comes	  at	  the	  "expense"	  of	   lower	   leverage	  and	  
hence	  lower	  profitability	  (i.e.	   lower	  valuation).	  Although	  the	  Jordan	  et.	  al	  (2011)	  paper	  finds	  a	  positive	  
relationship	  between	  Tier	  1	  and	  the	  market-­‐to-­‐book	  ratio,	  the	  author	  feels	  this	  was	  likely	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  
the	   time	  period	   investigated	   in	   that	   sample	  was	   essentially	   one	  of	   declining	   stock	  market	   prices,	   and	  
investors	  momentarily	  rewarded	  banks	  for	  setting	  money	  aside	  for	  safe	  keeping.	  This	  is	  probably	  not	  the	  
case	  under	  normal	  conditions.	  	  
	   The	   final	   set	   of	   variables	   encompasses	   loan	   composition	   (real	   estate	   and	   construction	   &	  
development).	   Both	   real	   estate	   loans	   and	   construction	   &	   development	   (C&D)	   are	   reported	   as	   a	  
percentage	  of	  total	  loans.	  The	  Bayazitova	  et.	  al.	  (2011)	  paper	  incorporated	  real	  estate	  loan	  composition	  
in	  that	  study	  but	  not	  development	   loans	  specifically.	  Real	  estate	   loans	  are	  the	  staple	   loans	  for	  a	  bank,	  
the	  more	  real	  estate	  loans,	  feasibly	  the	  higher	  the	  valuation.	  The	  author	  chose	  to	  include	  development	  
loans	  as	  well	  on	  a	  hunch	  that	  these	  riskier	  ventures	  would	  not	  be	  rewarded	  by	  the	  market.	  Development	  
loans	  have	  a	  high	  probability	  of	   failure	  as	  developments	   are	  more	   likely	   to	   flop	  due	   to	   the	   lack	  of	   an	  
income	  source	  in	  the	  near	  term.	  	  	  
	   In	  order	  to	  control	  for	  general	  market	  fluctuations	  that	  may	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  the	  price-­‐to-­‐book-­‐
value,	   the	   Standard	  &	  Poor's	   500	   index	  was	   included	   in	   the	   sample.	   This	  will	   likely	   capture	   any	   stock	  
price	  variation	  that	  is	  not	  a	  direct	  result	  of	  TARP.	  A	  complete	  set	  of	  technical	  definitions	  can	  be	  found	  in	  





The	  hypothesis	  to	  be	  tested	  in	  this	  paper	  based	  on	  previous	  literature	  are:	  
H1.	  A	  bank's	  price-­‐to-­‐tangible-­‐book	  value	  is	  negatively	  associated	  with	  the	  receipt	  of	  TARP	  funds.	  
H2.	  Price-­‐to-­‐tangible-­‐book	  value	  is	  negatively	  associated	  with	  non-­‐performing	  assets.	  Higher	  net	  charge	  
offs'	  and	  loan	  loss	  provisions	  are	  associated	  with	  lower	  valuations.	  	  
H3.	  Interest	  income	  will	  be	  positively	  associated	  with	  price-­‐to-­‐tangible	  book.	  	  
H4.	  Price-­‐to-­‐tangible-­‐book	  value	  is	  negatively	  associated	  with	  Tier	  1	  capital.	  
H5.	  Price-­‐to-­‐tangible-­‐book	  value	  is	  positively	  associated	  with	  real	  estate	  loans	  	  
	  
The	  hypothesis	  to	  be	  tested	  based	  on	  variables	  introduced	  by	  the	  author	  are:	  
H6.	  Quarters	  on	  TARP	  variable	  (how	  long	  a	  bank	  retains	  TARP)	  will	  be	  positively	  associated	  with	  a	  bank's	  
valuation	  especially	  for	  mid	  to	  small	  sized	  banks	  who	  still	  have	  outstanding	  TARP.	  	  
H7.	  Price-­‐to-­‐tangible-­‐book	  value	  is	  positively	  associated	  with	  return	  on	  average	  tangible	  common	  equity	  
and	  negatively	  associated	  with	  the	  efficiency	  ratio.	  	  
H8.	  A	   bank's	   valuation	  will	   be	   negatively	   associated	  with	   an	   increase	   in	   construction	  &	   development	  
loans.	  
4.	  Methodology	  and	  Data	  
4.1	  Data	  Set	  
	   The	  original	  list	  of	  banks	  was	  generated	  using	  SNL	  Financial	  and	  comprised	  a	  total	  of	  918	  publicly	  
traded	  banks	  as	  of	  the	  second	  quarter	  of	  2012.	  Of	  these,	  the	  sample	  was	  then	  cut	  to	  826	  due	  to	  lack	  of	  
information	  and	  missing	  variables.	  The	  sample	  has	  26,130	  observations	  spanning	  30	  quarters.	  	  
	   In	  order	   to	  differentiate	   the	  effects	  of	  TARP	  on	  different	  bank	  sizes	   the	  sample	  was	   then	  sub-­‐
divided	  into	  three.	  The	  first	  is	  comprised	  of	  large	  banks,	  understood	  here	  as	  banks	  with	  assets	  (averaged	  
over	  the	  period	  studied)	  of	  over	  5	  billion	  (5	  billion	  <	  assets),	   from	  here	  on	  out	  referred	  to	  as	  BIG.	  This	  
corresponds	   roughly	   to	   the	  90th	  percentile.	   The	   second	  subset	   consisted	  of	  medium	  sized	  banks	  with	  
assets	  (averaged	  over	  the	  period	  studied)	  greater	  than	  500	  million	  but	  less	  than	  or	  equal	  to	  5	  billion	  (500	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million	  <	   assets	   ≤	  5	  billion),	   from	  here	  on	  out	   referred	   to	   as	  MED.	   The	   final	   subset	  was	   comprised	  of	  
small	  banks	  with	  assets	  (averaged	  over	  the	  period	  studied)	  of	  less	  than	  or	  equal	  to	  500	  million	  (assets	  ≤	  
500	  million),	  from	  here	  on	  out	  referred	  to	  as	  SMALL.	  These	  correspond	  roughly	  to	  the	  25th	  percentile.	  	  
	   This	  division	  may	  seem	  somewhat	  arbitrary	  but	  different	  combinations	  were	  tested	  and	  this	  one	  
(top	  10%,	  middle	  and	  bottom	  25%)	  proved	   to	  capture	  significant	  differences	  by	  size.	  A	  chow	  test	  was	  
conducted	   to	   determine	   if	   the	   subset	   regressions	   were	   individually	   significant.	   We	   reject	   the	   null	  
hypothesis	  (that	  they	  aren't	  individually	  significant)	  at	  the	  1%	  level	  of	  significance.	  This	  suggests	  there	  is	  
something	   to	  dividing	   the	   sample	   in	   this	  manner.	  Results	   reported	   in	  Appendix	  B.	   	  A	   summary	  of	   the	  
sample	  and	   the	   subsets	  and	   the	  composition	  of	  each	   in	   relation	   to	  TARP	  participants	   can	  be	   found	   in	  
Table	  1.	  A	  correlation	  matrix	  of	  all	  variables	  is	  found	  in	  Appendix	  C.	  
	   Notice	  that	  participation	   in	  TARP	  was	  heavily	  concentrated	  on	  the	   larger	  banks	  and	  fell	  as	   the	  
size	   gets	   smaller.	   This	   corroborates	   the	   idea	   that	  banks	  who	   received	  TARP	  posed	  great	   systemic	   risk	  
(due	  to	  size),	  even	  though	  the	  number	  of	  banks	  in	  each	  category	  get	  bigger	  as	  the	  banks	  get	  smaller.	  	  	  
X=	  Average	  Assets	  over	  time	  period	  investigated All X<5billion 500	  million<X≤5	  billion X≤500	  million
(BIG) (MED) (SMALL)
Total	  Number	  of	  Banks 826 71 314 441
Banks	  who	  took	  TARP	  (%) 36% 71% 48% 23%
Percentage	  of	  Banks	  who	  Paid	  Back	  TARP* 50% 86% 54% 26%
Price	  to	  Book	  Ratio 132.59 204.39 145.01 100.66
TARP	  Dummy 0.16 0.19 0.21 0.11
Quarters	  on	  Tarp	  (TARP	  Banks	  Only) 10.83 6.87 11.36 12.48
Tier	  1	   13.49 11.98 12.97 14.43
Net	  Charge	  Off	  (NCO) 0.75 0.93 0.76 0.70
Provision	  for	  Loan	  Losses	   0.88 1.03 0.87 0.85
Non-­‐Performing	  Assets	  (NPA) 1.84 1.33 1.83 1.97
Interest	  Income 5.18 4.88 5.21 5.22
Efficiency	  Ratio 69.22 59.38 65.43 75.85
Return	  on	  Avg.	  Tang.	  Common	  Equity 6.00 11.09 7.19 3.41
Real-­‐estate	  Loans 58.58 45.92 58.26 62.17
Construction	  &	  Development	  Loans 10.09 9.33 11.20 9.08
Standard	  &	  Poor's	  500	   1232.57 1232.57 1232.57 1232.57
*A	  rough	  estimate	  of	  the	  number	  of	  banks	  who	  took	  TARP	  and	  paid	  it	  back	  during	  the	  time	  frame	  investigated.	  
Calculated	  by	  dividing	  the	  number	  of	  banks	  who	  paid	  off	  TARP	  by	  the	  highest	  number	  of	  participating	  banks	  
(usually	  in	  the	  first	  quarter	  2009).	  
Table	  1:	  Sample	  Statistics	  -­‐	  Means
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Table	  2	  has	  descriptive	  statistics	  for	  the	  sample	  and	  each	  of	  the	  subsets.	  	  
	  
	   	  
	   Figure	  2	  presents	  a	  snapshot	  of	  what	  is	  happening	  to	  the	  price-­‐to-­‐tangible-­‐book	  value	  of	  banks	  
throughout	  the	  period	  investigated,	  averaged	  out	  per	  quarter	  for	  the	  sample	  and	  the	  subsets.	  This	  figure	  
includes	  both	  banks	  that	  took	  and	  didn't	  take	  TARP.	  TARP	  begins	  effectively	  for	  some	  banks	  in	  the	  fourth	  
quarter	  of	  2008.	  The	  latest	  start	  date	  is	  the	  fourth	  quarter	  of	  2009.5	  
	  
	  
	   	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  There	  are	  a	  couple	  banks	  who	  received	  their	  TARP	  money	  after	  the	  fourth	  quarter	  2009,	  these	  are	  PSBR,	  HSBK,	  
and	  CRFN.	  	  
Variables
Sample All Large Medium Small All Big Medium Small All Large Medium Small
Price	  to	  Book	  Ratio 13449 1465 6257 5727 1.21 10.57 3.36 1.21 703.73 583.18 703.73 608.99
TARP	  Dummy 13449 1465 6257 5727 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Quarters	  Since	  Took	  Tarp 13449 1465 6257 5727 0 0 0 0 15 15 15 15
Tier	  1	   13449 1465 6257 5727 0.70 6.84 0.70 2.98 99.99 36.97 99.99 76.24
Net	  Charge	  Off	  (NCO) 13449 1465 6257 5727 -­‐4.60 -­‐0.59 -­‐4.10 -­‐4.60 15.86 8.77 15.86 15.75
Provision	  for	  Loan	  Losses	   13449 1465 6257 5727 -­‐4.29 -­‐0.71 -­‐3.76 -­‐4.29 9.98 7.70 9.98 9.80
Non-­‐Performing	  Assets	  (NPA) 13449 1465 6257 5727 0.0002 0.0005 0.0002 0.0005 29.93 10.39 15.75 29.93
Interest	  Income 13449 1465 6257 5727 -­‐7.65 -­‐7.65 0.36 1.21 14.61 12.04 9.33 14.61
Efficiency	  Ratio 13449 1465 6257 5727 24.67 28.03 24.67 30.76 308.94 177.67 308.94 275.12
Return	  on	  Avg.	  Tang.	  Common	  Equity 13449 1465 6257 5727 -­‐86.51 -­‐86.51 -­‐83.63 -­‐84.92 98.16 82.43 98.16 95
Real-­‐estate	  Loans 13449 1465 6257 5727 0.03 2.02 5.09 0.03 99.37 92.77 99.37 95.31
Construction	  &	  Development	  Loans 13449 1465 6257 5727 0 0.03 0 0 63.65 43.40 48.03 63.65
Standard	  &	  Poor's	  500	   13449 1465 6257 5727 807.67 807.67 807.67 807.67 1497.18 1497.18 1497.18 1497.18
N Min Max
Table	  2:	  Descriptive	  Statistics
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   Figure	  3	  presents	   the	  valuation	  of	  only	   the	  banks	   that	   took	  TARP.	  There	  are	  a	   two	  noticeable	  
differences	  between	  the	  graphs:	  the	  medium	  sized	  banks	  begin	  bellow	  the	  "All"	  sample	  and	  then	  rise,	  
and	  more	   importantly,	   there	   is	  a	   increase	   in	  small	  bank	  valuation	  starting	   in	  2012,	  marked	  by	  a	  circle,	  
which	  might	  suggest	  some	  speculation.	  
	  
	  
	   Figure	  4	  explores	  this	  further,	  separating	  small	  banks	  into	  those	  that	  took	  and	  those	  that	  didn't	  























Figure	  4:	  Average	  Price	  to	  Tangible	  Book	  Value	  by	  








	   It	  is	  also	  worthwhile	  investigating	  how	  many	  banks	  had	  TARP	  in	  a	  given	  quarter.	  Notice	  how	  for	  
the	  most	  part	  the	  graph	  is	  relatively	  flat	  for	  all	  subsets.	  Although	  there	  is	  cross	  sectional	  variation	  (aka.	  
between	  bank	  sizes),	  there	  is	  little	  variation	  over	  time.	  The	  larger	  sized	  banks	  move	  very	  quickly	  to	  pay	  
off	   TARP,	   especially	   after	   the	   pay	   restrictions	   imposed	   in	   the	   first	   quarter	   of	   2009.	   The	  medium	   and	  
small	  sized	  banks	  retain	  TARP	  much	  longer	  and	  have	  been	  much	  slower	  to	  pay	  it	  back.	  	  
4.2	  Methodology	  	  
	   The	  model	  chosen	  was	  a	  fixed	  effects	  regression	  model.	  This	  allows	  each	  bank	  to	  have	  its	  own	  
intercept	   and	   thus	   its	   own	   set	   of	   fixed	   factors	   not	   otherwise	   accounted	   for.	   Any	   time	   constant	  
explanatory	  variables	  are	  "removed,"	  including	  factors	  like	  relative	  size	  and	  management	  skill	  (assuming	  
management	  did	  not	  change).	  This	  model	  allows	  for	  an	  examination	  of	  coefficients	  on	  the	  variables	  that	  
change	  over	  time.	  	  


































TARP	  Dummy	  and	  QUARTERS	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M/B	  =	  Price/Tangible	  Book	  
TARP=	  Dummy	  (1	  if	  retains	  TARP,	  0	  if	  not)	  
QTRT	  =	  Quarters	  on	  TARP	  
QTRTSQR	  =	  Quarters	  on	  TARP	  Squared	  
NPA=	  Non	  Performing	  Assets/Total	  Assets	  
NCO	  =	  Net	  Charge	  Off/Average	  Total	  Loans	  
LLP=	  Loan	  Loss	  Provision/	  average	  loans	  
ROATCE	  =	  Return	  on	  Average	  Tangible	  Common	  Equity	  
II=	  Interest	  income/	  average	  assets	  
EFF	  =	  Efficiency	  Ratio	  
TIER1	  =	  Tier	  one	  capital	  ratio	  
RE=	  	  Real	  Estate	  Loans/	  Total	  Loans	  
CD	  =	  Construction	  and	  Development	  Loans/	  Total	  Loans	  

























Table	  3:	  General	  Results	  
	   	   	   	  	  	   ALL	   BIG	   MED	   SMALL	  
TARP	  Dummy	   -­‐33.37***	   -­‐36.55***	   -­‐35.85***	   -­‐14.49***	  
	  
(-­‐9.96)	   (-­‐3.22)	   (-­‐7.74)	   (-­‐2.69)	  
Quarters	  on	  TARP	   1.52*	   14.07***	   2.38*	   -­‐0.26	  
	  
(1.62)	   (4.24)	   (1.88)	   (-­‐0.18)	  
Quarters	  on	  TARP	  Squared	   -­‐0.074	   -­‐0.98***	   -­‐0.12	   -­‐0.07	  
	  
(-­‐1.22)	   (-­‐4.47)	   (-­‐1.52)	   (0.80)	  
Non-­‐Performing	  Assets	   -­‐9.78***	   -­‐26.48***	   -­‐12.67***	   -­‐6.23***	  
	  
(-­‐28.57)	   (-­‐13.27)	   (-­‐22.88)	   (-­‐16.56)	  
Net	  Charge	  Off	  (NCO)	   -­‐1.01**	   -­‐0.76	   0.20	   -­‐0.68	  
	  
(-­‐2.12)	   (-­‐0.26)	   (0.24)	   (-­‐1.38)	  
Provision	  for	  Loan	  Losses	  	   -­‐1.30**	   -­‐3.95	   -­‐3.10***	   -­‐1.08*	  
	  
(-­‐2.36)	   (-­‐1.41)	   (-­‐3.53)	   (-­‐1.72)	  
Return	  on	  Avg.	  Tang.	  Common	  Equity	   0.48***	   0.78***	   0.41***	   0.05	  
	  
(10.17)	   (4.59)	   (6.14)	   (0.76)	  
Interest	  Income	   23.95***	   16.29***	   25.44***	   20.47***	  
	  
(35.82)	   (7.13)	   (24.05)	   (24.77)	  
Efficiency	  Ratio	   0.22***	   -­‐0.093	   0.28***	   0.02	  
	  
(5.77)	   (-­‐0.45)	   (3.95)	   (0.53)	  
Tier	  1	  Capital	  Ratio	   -­‐2.32***	   -­‐10.98***	   -­‐2.00***	   -­‐0.16	  
	  
(-­‐13.49)	   (-­‐11.78)	   (-­‐7.83)	   (-­‐0.73)	  
Real	  Estate	  Loans	   -­‐0.19**	   0.38	   -­‐0.27**	   -­‐0.42***	  
	  
(-­‐2.49)	   (1.41)	   (-­‐2.18)	   (-­‐4.65)	  
Construction	  &	  Development	  Loans	   -­‐0.03	   -­‐1.32***	   -­‐0.39**	   0.13	  
	  
(-­‐0.08)	   (-­‐2.64)	   (-­‐2.10)	   (0.89)	  
S&P	  500	   0.018***	   0.011	   0.005	   0.026***	  
	  
(6.62)	   (0.91)	   (1.11)	   (8.62)	  
Constant	  	   36.24***	   275.31***	   63.14***	   2.64	  
	  
(4.56)	   (9.34)	   (5.13)	   (0.27)	  
Observations	   13449	   1465	   6257	   5727	  
R-­‐squared	   0.5037	   0.5988	   0.5622	   0.4161	  
F-­‐Test	   984.50	   158.54	   585.76	   289.06	  
***,**,*	  indicated	  significance	  at	  the	  1%,	  5%,	  and	  10%	  respectively,	  values	  in	  parenthesis	  are	  reported	  	  t-­‐statistics	  
	  
Note	  on	  interpretation:	  Price-­‐to-­‐tangible-­‐book	  value	  is	  usually	  a	  number	  between	  50-­‐300,	  where	  50	  means	  a	  bank	  is	  valued	  at	  half	  of	  what	  their	  
assets	  are	  worth,	  100	  meaning	  they	  are	  valued	  at	  exactly	  what	  their	  assets	  are	  worth,	  and	  200	  being	  twice	  what	  their	  assets	  are	  worth	  etc...	  A	  
negative	  thirty	  coefficient	  on	  the	  dummy	  means	  that	  taking	  TARP	  reduces	  a	  bank's	  price-­‐to-­‐tangible	  book	  by	  30.	  The	  same	  is	  true	  of	  the	  other	  
variables	  which	  are	  all	  ratios,	  a	  1%	  increase	  results	  in	  the	  a	  subsequent	  rise	  or	  drop	  in	  price-­‐to-­‐tangible	  book.	  The	  only	  exception	  is	  really	  the	  
S&P	  500	  whose	   scale	   is	   between	  800-­‐1500,	   thus	   the	   coefficient	  must	   be	   scaled	   accordingly.	   So	   for	   the	  ALL	   sample,	   an	   increase	   in	   the	   S&P	  






For	  easier	  interpretation,	  Table	  4	  summarizes	  the	  results	  related	  to	  TARP.	  
	  
Table	  4:	  General	  Results	  
	   	   	   	  	  	   ALL	   BIG	   MED	   SMALL	  
TARP	  Dummy	   -­‐33.37***	   -­‐36.55***	   -­‐35.85***	   -­‐14.49***	  
	  
(-­‐9.96)	   (-­‐3.22)	   (-­‐7.74)	   (-­‐2.69)	  
Quarters	  on	  TARP	   1.52*	   14.07***	   2.38*	   -­‐0.26	  
	  
(1.62)	   (4.24)	   (1.88)	   (-­‐0.18)	  
Quarters	  on	  TARP	  Squared	   -­‐0.074	   -­‐0.98***	   -­‐0.12	   -­‐0.07	  
	  	   (-­‐1.22)	   (-­‐4.47)	   (-­‐1.52)	   (0.80)	  
***,**,*	  indicated	  significance	  at	  the	  1%,	  5%,	  and	  10%	  respectively,	  values	  in	  parenthesis	  are	  reported	  	  t-­‐statistics	  
	  
	   There	   are	   a	   couple	   things	   to	   note	   about	   a	   bank's	   valuation	   as	   represented	   by	   its	   price-­‐to-­‐
tangible-­‐book	  value	  and	  its'	  relationship	  to	  TARP.	  The	  first	  and	  in	  line	  with	  the	  literature,	  is	  that	  taking	  
TARP	  has	  an	  immediate	  negative	  effect	  on	  how	  much	  a	  bank	  is	  worth	  ceteris	  paribus	  and	  these	  effects	  
are	  significant	  at	  the	  1%	  level	  for	  all	  three	  bank	  size	  subsets.	  Large	  and	  middle	  sized	  banks	  took	  greater	  
hits	  which	  corroborates	  the	  idea	  that	  having	  TARP	  for	  a	  larger	  bank	  was	  very	  often	  punitive,	  whereas	  for	  
a	  smaller	  bank	  this	  was	  less	  so.	  The	  second	  point	  to	  be	  made	  is	  that	  after	  the	  initial	  drop	  we	  find	  that	  
with	   each	   subsequent	   quarter,	   and	   the	   closer	   we	   get	   to	   the	   deadline,	   there	   is	   a	   positive	   effect	  
associated	  with	  keeping	  TARP.	  This	   is	   true	  of	   large	  and	  medium	  sized	  banks	  but	  not	  of	  small	  banks	  as	  
originally	   predicted.	   Interestingly	   enough,	   for	   the	   large	   banks,	   this	   relationship	   is	   non-­‐linear,	   curving	  
downwards.	  Figure	  6	  represents	  these	  graphically.	  The	  graphs	  were	  calculated	  using	  the	  significant	  TARP	  
variables	  only.	  	  
	   An	  F-­‐test	  was	  conducted	  to	  determine	   if	   the	  TARP	  variables	  were	   jointly	  significant.	  We	  reject	  
the	   null	   hypothesis	   (that	   they	   aren't	   jointly	   significant)	   at	   the	   5%	   level	   of	   significance.	   See	   results	   in	  
Appendix	  D.	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   Although	  large	  banks	  recover	  very	  quickly	  from	  the	  initial	  drop	  in	  valuation,	  holding	  on	  to	  TARP	  
past	   seven	   quarters	   drives	   their	   stock	   price	   down,	   again	   suggesting	   that	   retaining	   TARP	   money	   is	  
ultimately	  punitive	  over	  time.	  This	   is	  very	  much	  driven	  by	  the	  data	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  average	  large	  
bank	  retained	  their	  TARP	  money	  6.87	  quarters	  (see	  Table	  1).	  In	  fact,	  by	  the	  eighth	  quarter	  only	  25	  large	  
banks	   still	   held	   on	   to	   their	   TARP	   debt,	   less	   than	   50%	  of	   the	   original	   number	   of	   large	   banks	   that	   first	  
participated	  in	  the	  program	  (see	  BIG<25	  curve).	  As	  mentioned,	  the	  larger	  banks	  moved	  to	  pay	  quickly	  so	  
as	  to	  avoid	  pay	  restrictions,	  the	  model	  reflects	  this.	  It	  makes	  sense	  that	  their	  valuation	  would	  drop,	  for	  
only	   a	   handful	   of	   large	   banks	   still	   had	   TARP	   past	   seven	   quarters	   and	   they	   were	   feasibly	   the	   worse	  
performing	  of	   the	   larger	  banks.	  By	   the	  end	  of	   the	   sample	   in	   the	   second	  quarter	  of	  2012,	  only	  8	   large	  
banks	  still	  had	  TARP,	  whereas	  in	  the	  first	  quarter	  of	  2009	  there	  were	  59.	  
	   As	  we	  near	  the	  interest	  rate	  "jump,"	  medium	  sized	  bank's	  valuations	  are	  rising	  due	  to	  the	  time	  
effects	   related	   to	   retaining	   TARP,	   all	   other	   things	   held	   equal.	   This	  may	   be	   suggestive	   of	   speculation.	  
These	  would	  be	   the	  banks	   that	   are	  worthy	   takeover	   targets	   in	   that	   they	  probably	   retain	   enough	  of	   a	  

























Quarters	  on	  TARP	  
Figure	  6:	  Effects	  TARP	  on	  Price-­‐to-­‐Tangible-­‐Book	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a	  bank	  in	  this	  size	  bracket	  is	  an	  indicator	  that	  they	  may	  be	  a	  potential	  takeover	  target.	  They	  are	  neither	  
small	  enough	  to	  keep	  existing	  (or	  declare	  bankruptcy)	  neither	  are	  they	  large	  enough	  to	  have	  economies	  
of	  scale.	  TARP	  just	  might	  be	  the	  factor	  that	  pushes	  them	  over	  the	  brink.	  All	  that	  said	  and	  as	  mentioned	  
before,	   although	   there	   is	   cross	   sectional	   variation	  between	   subset	   size	  groups,	   there	   is	   little	   variation	  
across	  time	  within	  a	  given	  size	  group	  in	  the	  number	  of	  banks	  that	  pay	  off	  TARP.	  As	  figure	  5	  reveals,	  the	  
number	   of	  middle	   sized	   banks	   that	   paid	   off	   TARP	  was	   relatively	   unchanged	   in	   the	   sample,	   possibly	   a	  
function	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  have	  not	  yet	  reached	  the	  interest	  rate	  "jump."	  
	   Contrary	   to	   what	   was	   predicted,	   small	   bank	   valuations	   are	   static.	   This	   is	   not	   altogether	  
unreasonable	   in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  market	  may	  be	  perceiving	  them	  as	  unable	  to	  pay	  their	  TARP	  debt,	  
much	  because	  of	  their	  size.	  They	  may	  not	  be	  worth	  buying	  in	  anticipation	  of	  a	  takeover.	  It	  may	  also	  be	  
that	  these	  banks	  are	  so	  small,	  no	  larger	  bank	  would	  want	  to	  buy	  them,	  for	  they	  do	  not	  capture	  enough	  
of	   a	   market	   share	   to	   be	   worth	   the	   effort.	   If	   there	   isn't	   a	   possibility	   of	   a	   bid,	   then	   there	   can	   be	   no	  
speculation.	  Much	  like	  for	  the	  middle	  sized	  banks,	  there	  is	  may	  not	  be	  enough	  variation	  over	  time	  (see	  
figure	  5).	  	  
	   As	   predicted	   non-­‐performing	   assets	   are	   negative	   and	   significantly	   so	   across	   the	   board.	   This	  
corroborates	  the	  existing	  literature.	  The	  more	  loans	  in	  a	  bank'	  s	  portfolio	  that	  are	  not	  paying	  interest	  or	  
need	   to	  be	   renegotiated,	   the	  more	  property	  a	  bank	  has	   to	   repossess,	   the	  worse	  off	   the	  bank	  and	   its'	  
valuation.	   Interestingly,	   the	   larger	   the	  bank	   the	  more	   they	  are	  penalized	   for	  an	   increase	   in	   their	  non-­‐
performing	   assets	   which	   is	   no	   real	   surprise	   given	   these	   banks	   are	   more	   carefully	   scrutinized	   by	   the	  
market.	  
	   Net	   charge	   off,	   or	   loans	   written	   off	   the	   books	   came	   up	   as	   insignificant	   for	   the	   subsets	   but	  
significant	  for	  the	  entire	  sample.	  This	  suggests,	  once	  again,	  that	  there	  are	  differences	  across	  size	  groups	  
but	  not	  within	  a	  size	  subset.	  Nonetheless	  and	  in	  line	  with	  the	  literature,	  more	  loans	  written	  off	  a	  bank's	  
balance	  sheet,	   the	  worse	   their	  valuations.	   In	   line	  with	   the	  previous	   two	  measures	  of	   credit,	   taking	  on	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more	  provisions	  to	  secure	  for	  bad	  loans	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  negative	  sign	  by	  the	  market,	  especially	  for	  medium	  
sized	  banks.	  For	  large	  banks	  this	  came	  up	  as	  insignificant.	  	  
	   In	   terms	   of	   measures	   of	   performance,	   there	   are	   a	   couple	   things	   worth	   noting.	   As	   expected	  
return	   on	   average	   tangible	   common	   equity	   was	   positively	   related	   to	   a	   bank's	   price-­‐to-­‐tangible-­‐book	  
value	   (except	   for	   small	   banks	   which	   was	   insignificant).	   The	   more	   net	   profit	   a	   bank	   generates	   with	  
investor	   equity,	   the	   better	   its	   valuation.	   In	   line	  with	   the	   literature,	   an	   increase	   in	   interest	   income,	   or	  
income	  on	  outstanding	  loans,	  the	  higher	  a	  bank's	  valuation.	  Interestingly,	  medium	  sized	  banks	  register	  
the	   largest	  coefficient,	  whereas	   larger	  banks	  (which	  have	  other	  sources	  of	  revenue),	  register	  a	  smaller	  
one.	   The	   final	   performance	   variable,	   or	   the	   efficiency	   ratio,	  was	   positively	   related	   a	   bank's	   valuation.	  
This	   was	   not	   as	   expected.	   The	   efficiency	   ratio	   captures	   how	   much	   a	   bank	   would	   need	   to	   spend	   to	  
generate	  an	  additional	  dollar	  of	  revenue,	  the	  higher	  this	  number,	  the	  worse	  a	  bank	  is	  run.	  The	  fact	  that	  
it	   comes	   up	   as	   positive	   and	   significant	   for	  medium	   sized	   banks,	   and	   insignificant	   for	   large	   and	   small	  
banks,	  may	  corroborate	   the	   takeover	   thesis.	   It	  may	  be	   that	   investors	  are	  speculating	  upon	  banks	   that	  
have	   bad	   management	   teams,	   which	   would	   explain	   why	   having	   a	   higher	   efficiency	   ratio	   (thus	   less	  
efficient	  bank)	  results	  in	  a	  higher	  valuation.	  	  
	   In	  terms	  of	  capital,	  and	  in	  line	  with	  the	  hypothesis,	  increasing	  the	  Tier	  1	  ratio	  depresses	  a	  bank's	  
valuation	   in	   that	   they	  are	  operating	  with	   less	   leverage.	   This	   is	   especially	   true	  of	   the	   larger	  banks	   and	  
insignificant	  for	  the	  smaller	  ones.	  
	   Loan	  composition	  generated	  some	  interesting	  results.	  A	  1%	  increase	  in	  real	  estate	   loans,	   leads	  
to	  a	  decrease	   in	  a	  medium	  and	  small	  sized	  bank's	  valuation.	  The	  effect	   is	   insignificant	   for	   large	  banks.	  
This	  may	  just	  be	  due	  to	  the	  overwhelming	  negative	  effects	  of	  sub-­‐prime	  mortgages	  (included	  within	  the	  
real	   estate	   loan	   numbers),	   and	   a	   reflection	   of	   the	   time	   period	   studied.	   As	   predicted,	   an	   increase	   in	  
construction	  and	  development	  loans	  suppresses	  large	  and	  medium	  sized	  bank's	  valuation,	  a	  reflection	  of	  
how	  risky	  they	  are.	  	  	  
27	  
	  
	   On	  a	  final	  note,	  the	  S&P	  (which	  fluctuates	  between	  800-­‐1500)	  greatly	  influences	  the	  valuation	  of	  
small	  banks.	  A	  sign	  these	  smaller	  banks	  are	  highly	  correlated	  with	  the	  market	  as	  a	  whole,	  whereas	  large	  
and	  medium	  sized	  banks	  are	  more	  influenced	  by	  other	  factors.	  	  
6.	  Conclusion	  
	   This	  study	  set	  out	  to	  determine	  if	  banks	  that	  still	  retain	  TARP	  are	  being	  perceived	  by	  the	  market	  
as	   potential	   takeover	   targets,	  while	   accounting	   for	   a	   series	   of	   fundamental	   bank	  metrics	   as	  well	   as	   a	  
general	   market	   index.	   In	   the	   time	   period	   investigated,	   from	   the	   first	   quarter	   of	   2005	   to	   the	   second	  
quarter	   of	   2012,	   the	   results	   show	   that	  middle	   sized	  banks,	  whose	   assets	   range	   from	  500	  million	   to	   5	  
billion,	  that	  still	  retain	  TARP,	  may	  be	  perceived	  as	  takeover	  targets.	   	  Simply	  taking	  TARP	  will	  depress	  a	  
bank's	  valuation	  independent	  of	  size,	  but	  as	  we	  near	  the	  time	  when	  the	  interest	  on	  TARP	  debt	  rises	  to	  
9%,	  middle	  sized	  TARP	  bank's	  price-­‐to-­‐tangible-­‐book	  value	  are	  positively	  associated	  with	  retaining	  TARP,	  
a	  possible	   sign	  of	   speculation.	  This	   is	   corroborated	  by	  a	  positive	   coefficient	  on	   the	  efficiency	   ratio	   for	  
middle	   sized	   banks.	   All	   that	   said,	   although	   there	   was	   variation	   across	   bank	   sizes,	   there	   was	   little	  
variation	   across	   time	   for	   the	   middle	   and	   small	   sized	   banks.	   The	   only	   size	   category	   that	   really	   had	  
variation	  across	  time	  in	  relation	  to	  TARP	  were	  the	  large	  banks.	  	  
	   This	  study	  also	  finds	  that	  banks	  with	  lower	  non-­‐performing	  assets,	  net	  charge	  off's,	  provision	  for	  
loan	  losses,	  tier	  1	  ratios,	  real	  estate	  and	  development	  loans	  are	  associated	  with	  higher	  valuations.	  Banks	  
with	   lower	   returns	   on	   average	   tangible	   common	   equity	   and	   interest	   income	   have	   lower	   price-­‐to-­‐
tangible-­‐book	  values.	  	  	  
	   If	   anything,	   this	   study	   provides	   evidence	   that	   different	   bank	   sizes	   trade	   and	   are	   priced	   very	  
differently	   from	   one	   another.	   In	   a	   sense	   this	   is	   a	   reflection	   of	   the	   fact	   their	   business	   is	   often	   very	  
different.	  Different	  fundamental	  metrics	  matter	  more	  for	  certain	  bank	  sizes	  than	  others,	  especially	   for	  
the	   really	   large	   and	   really	   small.	  Whereas	   large	   banks	   are	   heavily	   punished	   for	   increasing	   their	   non-­‐
performing	  assets	   and	   tier	  1	   ratio,	  medium	  and	   small	   banks	  are	  heavily	   rewarded	   for	   increasing	   their	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interest	  income.	  Smaller	  banks	  valuations	  seem	  to	  follow	  the	  S&P	  500,	  whereas	  the	  market's	  valuation	  
of	  large	  and	  medium	  sized	  banks	  are	  less	  tied	  to	  the	  overall	  market	  behavior.	  
	  6.1.	  Limitations	  
	   The	  generalization	  of	  the	  results	  presented	  here	  may	  be	  affected	  by	  a	  few	  limitations.	  The	  first	  is	  
a	  function	  of	  the	  data	  itself.	  Although	  a	  large	  data	  set	  was	  comprised	  using	  SNL	  financial	  and	  SEC	  fillings,	  
a	  lot	  of	  information	  was	  still	  missing,	  which	  meant	  a	  good	  portion	  of	  the	  observations	  got	  dropped	  in	  the	  
regression.6	  This	  was	  probably	  the	  result	  of	  either	  it	  being	  unavailable	  or	  it	  may	  just	  be	  that	  the	  banks	  in	  
question	  never	  reported	  them,	  especially	  the	  smaller	  ones.	  There	  may	  be	  some	  endogeneity	  issues	  here,	  
where	  non-­‐reporting	  may	  mean	  there	  was	  something	  to	  hide.	  The	  second	  limitation	  was	  a	  function	  of	  
the	   sample	   selection	   itself.	   Since	   the	   banks	   chosen	   for	   the	   analysis	   were	   those	   that	   made	   it	   to	   the	  
second	  quarter	  of	  2012	  without	  going	  bankrupt	  or	  without	  being	  a	  target	  of	  a	  merger,	  there	  may	  be	  a	  
"survivors	  bias."	  Unfortunately	  this	  was	  a	  result	  of	  the	  unavailability	  of	  the	  data,	  especially	  in	  relation	  to	  
the	  specific	  mergers	  that	  occurred	  during	  the	  period.	  	  
	   The	  final	  limitation	  is	  the	  time	  frame.	  The	  banks	  in	  question	  have	  a	  mere	  five	  quarters	  until	  the	  
interest	  rate	  on	  their	  TARP	  loans	  rise.	  In	  order	  to	  capture	  if	  this	  would	  really	  push	  them	  to	  sell,	  this	  study	  
would	  have	  to	  be	  extended	   into	  the	  third	  quarter	  of	  2013.	  This	  would	  certainly	  help	  with	  the	   issue	  of	  
variation	  across	  time	  for	  the	  middle	  and	  small	  sized	  banks.	  Future	  research	  may	  wish	  to	  extend	  the	  time	  
frame	  while	  focusing	  in	  on	  the	  middle	  tiered	  bank	  group.	  	  
	   Nonetheless	  this	  study	  did	  provide	  a	  series	  of	  contributions.	  It	  expanded	  the	  knowledge	  on	  how	  
certain	   fundamental	   variables	   interact	   with	   price-­‐to-­‐book-­‐ratios	   as	   well	   as	   introduced	   variables	   to	  
capture	  the	  time	  effects	  of	  TARP.	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Price/Tangible	  Book	  Value	  
Price as a percent of tangible book value per share. Tangible book value is calculated using financial period end 
tangible common equity and common shares outstanding values. 
	  
Nonperforming	  Assets/	  Total	  Assets	  
Nonperforming	  assets	  (nonaccrual	  loans	  and	  leases,	  renegotiated	  loans	  and	  leases,	  and	  real	  estate	  
owned)	  as	  a	  percent	  of	  assets	  
 
Net Charge Off's/Average Loans 
Loans and leases charged off, net of recoveries, as a percent of average loans, net of average guaranteed loans, and 
leases 
 
Loan Loss Provision/Average Loans 
Provision for possible losses on loans and leases as a percent of average loans 
	  
Return	  on	  Average	  Tangible	  Common	  Equity	  
Net income, adjusted for tax-affected amortization of intangibles, as a percent of average tangible common equity 
 
Interest Income/Avg. Assets  
Interest earned on loans and leases, and dividends earned on investment securities plus any deferred loan fees 
amortized into income during the period divided by avg. assets 
 
Efficiency Ratio 
Noninterest expense before foreclosed property expense, amortization of intangibles, and goodwill impairments as a 
percent of net interest income (fully taxable equivalent, if available) and noninterest revenues, excluding only gains 
from securities transactions and nonrecurring items.  
 
Tier 1 
Tier 1 capital as a percent of total risk-adjusted assets. 
 
Real Estate Loans/Total Loans 
Unpaid principal balance of real estate loans held on balance sheet for investment purposes and originated for 
domestic offices, as a percent of total loans 
 
Construction & Development Loans/Total Loans 
Unpaid principal balance of construction & development loans held on balance sheet for investment purposes and 
originated for domestic offices, as a percent of total loans. 
 
TARP Dummy 
Dummy variable that receives a 1 if a bank has TARP in a given quarter and 0 if a bank does not have TARP in a 
given quarter or ever. Quarters in which a bank took TARP receives a 1. Quarters in which they pay it back receive a 
0. 
 
Quarters on TARP 
A variable that counts up the number of quarters a bank has TARP.  
 
Standard & Poor's 500 








	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Definitions	  from	  SNL	  Financial	  except	  for	  constructed	  variables	  and	  S&P	  500	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Appendix	  B	  -­‐	  Chow	  Test	  
	  
𝑆𝑆𝑅!""	  =	  54258257.6	  
𝑆𝑆𝑅!"# 	  =	  8268149.42	  
𝑆𝑆𝑅!"#	  =	  24883339.1	  
𝑆𝑆𝑅!"#$$	  =	  12103943.9	  
	  
F(hat)	  =	  190.51	  	  
	  
𝐹!",!"#"$	  (critical	  value)	  at	  1%	  level	  of	  significance	  =	  3.165	  	  
	  
F(hat)	  ˃	  F	  (critical	  value)	  
	  
190.51	  ˃	  3.165	  
	  
We	  reject	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  subset	  regressions	  are	  insignificant	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  alternative	  




































































          sp     0.2314  -0.2545  -0.0348   0.0486   0.0094  -0.1947  -0.2776  -0.1767   0.2770  -0.1045   0.2376  -0.0282   0.0036   1.0000
     cdloans     0.0733   0.0491  -0.0082  -0.0295  -0.1344   0.0868   0.1362   0.1482   0.3010   0.0323  -0.1087  -0.3228   1.0000
     reloans    -0.2281   0.0026   0.0447   0.0581   0.1693  -0.0356  -0.0634   0.1006  -0.1860   0.0704  -0.0679   1.0000
      roatce     0.4623  -0.2332  -0.1563  -0.1009  -0.0092  -0.5291  -0.6518  -0.5066   0.2089  -0.5094   1.0000
    effratio    -0.3797  -0.0008   0.0055   0.0084   0.0937   0.1765   0.1443   0.3333  -0.1693   1.0000
interestin~e     0.3528  -0.2332  -0.2509  -0.2291  -0.1556  -0.1926  -0.1287  -0.3331   1.0000
         npa    -0.4832   0.2904   0.2888   0.2486  -0.0787   0.4768   0.4164   1.0000
   provision    -0.2527   0.2633   0.1678   0.1030  -0.0157   0.7351   1.0000
         nco    -0.2651   0.2637   0.2213   0.1669  -0.0012   1.0000
     tierone    -0.1743  -0.0299  -0.0043   0.0059   1.0000
 qtrstarpsqr    -0.2084   0.7021   0.9585   1.0000
    qtrstarp    -0.2433   0.8527   1.0000
        tarp    -0.2554   1.0000
 pricetobook     1.0000
                                                                                                                                            
               pricet~k     tarp qtrstarp qtrsta~r  tierone      nco provis~n      npa intere~e effratio   roatce  reloans  cdloans       sp
33	  
	  
Appendix	  D	  -­‐	  Jointly	  Significance	  Test	  for	  TARP	  Variables	  
	  
Unrestricted	  =	  With	  all	  TARP	  variables	  
Restricted	  =	  Without	  TARP	  variables	  
	  
ALL	  
𝑅!	  (unrestricted)	  =	  0.4111	  
𝑅!	  (restricted)	  =	  0.4005	  
F(hat)	  =	  87.5	  
	  
𝐹!",!"##$	  (critical	  value)	  at	  5%	  level	  of	  significance	  =	  2.606	  	  
	  
F(hat)	  ˃	  F	  (critical	  value)	  
87.5	  >	  2.606	  
	  
We	  reject	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  TARP	  variables	  are	  insignificant	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  alternative	  
hypothesis	  because	  the	  F(hat)	  value	  is	  larger	  than	  the	  F(critical	  value)	  at	  the	  5%	  level	  of	  significance.	  	  
	  
BIG	  
𝑅!	  (unrestricted)	  =	  0.5370	  
𝑅!	  (restricted)	  =	  0.5341	  
F(hat)	  =	  3.33	  
	  
𝐹!",!"#!	  (critical	  value)	  at	  5%	  level	  of	  significance	  =	  2.611	  	  
	  
F(hat)	  ˃	  F	  (critical	  value)	  
3.33	  >	  2.611	  
	  
We	  reject	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  TARP	  variables	  are	  insignificant	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  alternative	  
hypothesis	  because	  the	  F(hat)	  value	  is	  larger	  than	  the	  F(critical	  value)	  at	  the	  5%	  level	  of	  significance.	  
	  
MED	  
𝑅!	  (unrestricted)	  =	  0.4406	  
𝑅!	  (restricted)	  =	  0.4246	  
F(hat)	  =	  53.0	  
	  
𝐹!",!"#$	  (critical	  value)	  at	  5%	  level	  of	  significance	  =	  2.606	  	  
	  
F(hat)	  ˃	  F	  (critical	  value)	  
53.0	  >	  2.606	  
	  
We	  reject	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  TARP	  variables	  are	  insignificant	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  alternative	  








𝑅!	  (unrestricted)	  =	  0.3240	  
𝑅!	  (restricted)	  =	  0.3111	  
F(hat)	  =	  43.0	  
	  
𝐹!",!"#$	  (critical	  value)	  at	  5%	  level	  of	  significance	  =	  2.606	  	  
	  
F(hat)	  ˃	  F	  (critical	  value)	  
43.0	  >	  2.606	  
	  
We	  reject	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  TARP	  variables	  are	  insignificant	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  alternative	  
hypothesis	  because	  the	  F(hat)	  value	  is	  larger	  than	  the	  F(critical	  value)	  at	  the	  5%	  level	  of	  significance.	  
	  
